Q345低合金结构钢的高温强度试验研究

采用恒温加载试验方法对钢结构建筑常用的Q345低合金结构钢的高温强度进行试验研究,采用切线交点法确定钢材有效屈服强度,并与其它方法强度取值进行对比,给出钢材高温强度回归公式,为钢结构建筑的抗火分析提供依据。     

建筑火灾烟气蔓延规律对火灾探测系统的影响

分析了烟在建筑物内部的蔓延规律,讨论了烟气的蔓延规律、气流速度、障碍物及房间高度对火灾探测系统的影响,得出研究火灾烟气蔓延规律对火灾探测系统的可靠性具有重要意义的结论。     

热真空条件下工作的电气电缆载流量计算与试验

高空制导飞行器从母舱释放后,制导舱与仪器舱之间部分电气电缆处于热真空条件下工作。对此种特定条件下的电缆进行了载流量计算。理论计算表明,给定的电缆设计满足在热真空条件下正常工作要求。最后简略介绍了载流量试验。     

舰空导弹武器系统软件靶场综合测试分析

针对舰空导弹武器系统的特点以及舰空导弹武器系统软件定型试验的现状,指出了舰空导弹武器系统软件靶场测试的必要性、特殊性。通过靶场软件测试综合试验,总结了舰空导弹武器系统软件靶场定型的试验方法。并指出了靶场软件测试的发展方向。     

How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III

Ron Rosenbaum, How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III. Simon & Schuster, 2011. 305 pages, $28.     

KICKING THE HORNETS’ NEST

This article applies the concept of nuclear ambivalence to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear ambivalence differs from other approaches to understanding nuclear proliferation in that it focuses on the deeply misunderstood relationship between the two potential uses of nuclear power: energy and weapons. According to this theory, the civilian applications of nuclear technology cannot be separated from the potential military applications and vice versa. Ambivalence, therefore, extends into the realm of states’ nuclear intentions, making it impossible to know with certainty what a potential proliferator's “true” intentions are. This article will demonstrate that the concept of nuclear ambivalence applies in the case of Iran, suggesting that current international nonproliferation efforts run the risk of encouraging rather than discouraging Iranian weaponization. The final section outlines recommendations for policy makers to reverse this counterproductive nonproliferation approach.     

OF HAWKS AND DOVES

The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally, despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors’ findings indicate that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to which nuclear aspirants’ sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention.     

INTEGRATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES TO ENABLE SIGNIFICANT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS

In his 2009 Prague speech and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. There is an inherent tension between these two goals that is best addressed through improved integration of nuclear weapons objectives with nuclear arms control objectives. This article reviews historical examples of the interaction between the two sets of objectives, develops a framework for analyzing opportunities for future integration, and suggests specific ideas that could benefit the nuclear weapons enterprise as it undergoes transformation and that could make the future enterprise compatible with a variety of arms control futures.     

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITALY: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations

Despite the fact that Italy hosts almost half of the remaining estimated 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) that are currently deployed in Europe, case studies of Italy have been largely neglected. The article seeks to fill that gap by outlining the key elements of Italy's position regarding the presence, role, and future of TNW in Italy. By considering both the military and political-symbolic dimensions of TNW, the author argues that Italy has largely embraced the process of the devaluation of nuclear weapons; however, this is offset by the country's determination to preserve the principles of solidarity and the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security. By making the alliance's cohesion a priority, Italy appears willing to postpone the complete elimination of TNW from its territory if necessary; despite this, Italy otherwise considers TNW to be not only weapons of little intrinsic value but also obstacles to the global nuclear disarmament program that it strongly supports.     

PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”

Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.